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groups, including (often most prominently) organized labor. 
This book addresses critical questions arising from these debates. Why have Western industrial relations 
systems experienced widespread destabilization since the late 1970s? What accounts for the prolonged 
decline of unions in the turbulent markets and changed political circumstances of the past decade? Are 
contemporary unions, once critical bastions in the historical development of political and industrial 
democracy, now a spent force, increasingly irrelevant in highly differentiated modern societies (playing 
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industrial adjustment? What, if any, conditions are necessary for contemporary unions to succeed in 
advanced industrial democracies? 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Politics of Work Reorganization: 
Pervasive Union Decline? 
1 hese are hard times for unions. There is currently a broad cross-
national trend toward the decentralization of bargaining in industrial re-
lations, which challenges established bases of union influence everywhere. 
*-— The combined effects of intensified world market competition, new mi-
croelectronic technologies, managerial strategies to reorganize production, 
and the success and influence of Japanese production models are exerting 
great pressure on systems of industrial relations in Western Europe and 
North America; in many societies, unions are among the major losers in 
political realignments and industrial adjustment. Alongside wide-ranging 
discussions of competitiveness and the causes and consequences of trade 
and other economic problems, heated debate is heard in both public and 
academic arenas within every industrial society concerning the contem-
porary position of major interest groups, including (often most promi-
nently) organized labor. 
This book addresses critical questions arising from these debates. Why 
have Western industrial relations systems experienced widespread desta-
bilization since the late 1970s? What accounts for the prolonged decline 
of unions in the turbulent markets and changed political circumstances of 
the past decade? Are contemporary unions, once critical bastions in the 
historical development of political and industrial democracy, now a spent 
force, increasingly irrelevant in highly differentiated modern societies 
(playing important roles only in countries in earlier stages of development 
such as Poland and South Korea)? If not, what constructive role can unions 
play in a period of market turbulence and rapid, continuous industrial 
1 
2 Democracy at Work 
adjustment? What, if any, conditions are necessary for contemporary 
unions to succeed in advanced industrial democracies? 
The argument advanced here recognizes both pervasive contemporary 
changes in industrial relations and contrasting outcomes in different coun-
tries. The starting point is recognition that dramatically changing world 
markets have transformed the tasks facing companies and unions. Inten-
sified market competition, new technologies, and path-breaking Japanese 
production models have created managerial imperatives to reorganize pro-
duction and work, confronting unions with unexpected challenges. Labor 
leaders schooled in the politics of wage negotiation and contract enforce-
ment suddenly find themselves confronted with the politics of work re-
organization: conflicts and negotiations that precede or accompany 
managerial attempts to reorganize work. Since the late 1970s, these 
market-driven changes have destabilized systems of industrial relations 
and in many cases undermined the traditional bases of union influence, 
setting the stage for further union decline. The effects of the new market-
driven imperatives, however, vary substantially from country to country, 
depending on the institutions of industrial relations in place. For explaining 
national variations in the stability and extent of workers' interest repre-
sentation, two variables are critical: integration into processes of mana-
gerial decision making versus adversarial, arm's-length unionism; and the 
presence or absence of laws or corporatist bargaining arrangements that 
encourage and regulate firm-level union participation from outside the 
firm. Where union integration and appropriate laws or corporatist bar-
gaining arrangements prevail, unions have adapted well to challenges 
posed by the reorganization of work. Where the opposite institutional 
attributes prevail, unions have declined substantially in influence since 
the late 1970s. In the United States at least, this argument runs counter 
to received industrial relations and union wisdom, which favors arm's-
length unionism (viewing integration as the path to co-optation and weak-
ness), a decentralized labor movement (in which competitive organizing 
spurs the expansion of union influence), and a minimum of government 
intrusion into collective bargaining and plant-level labor-management 
relations. 
In short, I emphasize the general driving force of world market changes 
and new technologies and the particular national institutions that represent 
workers' interests, shape domestic response, and account for contrasting 
national outcomes. This perspective differs from most analyses of the fate 
of unions and industrial relations systems, both traditional and con-
temporary. 
The dominant quest in the recent literature is to account for the decline 
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of unions. The studies fall into two broad groupings: general explanations 
for widespread cross-national decline that invoke pervasive social, eco-
nomic, or political forces;' and country-specific explanations that empha-
size the behavior of the major national actors in industrial relations— 
firms, unions, and governments. The difficulty with the first group is that 
union decline is not pervasive; the second category is flawed because 
country-specific analyses fail to explain why union decline and destabi-
lization in industrial relations are occurring in many advanced industrial 
societies, which indicates that more general processes are at work. Al-
though both sets of explanations may be theoretically weak, they can 
provide useful insights toward developing a theoretical argument that 
accounts for differentiated outcomes. 
Several recent comparative analyses grapple with similar questions. 
Michael Wallerstein (1989) offers a far-reaching explanation for contrast-
ing cross-national levels of union density (the key variables are size of 
the labor market and cumulative left-party participation in government); 
but his data end in 1979 and in any case could not account for the dynamic 
changes under way since then. Other analyses, such as those developed 
by Alan Altshuler et al. (1984), Harry Katz and Charles F. Sabel (1985), 
and Richard B. Freeman (1989), offer comparative, institutional perspec-
tives that fall into the same arena with this one, although differing in 
important details; in Chapter 3 and in the Conclusion, I examine these 
arguments in relation to my own and to the evidence considered. 
The argument developed here builds on two sets of literature. First is 
the recent innovative work in international and comparative political econ-
omy. Researchers have identified dynamic changes in the international 
political economy and effects on domestic outcomes such as the organi-
zation of production (Piore and Sabel 1984; Cohen and Zysman 1987; 
Gilpin 1987; the French "regulation" school).2 Comparative political 
economists with a particular interest in unions have tied this work to 
analyses of changing industrial relations and the prospects for union in-
fluence (Lange, Ross, and Vannicelli 1982; Gourevitch et al. 1984; Streeck 
1984a; Sorge and Streeck 1988). Related studies over the past fifteen years 
1
 See Ross and Fishman 1989 for a brief but useful survey of the general arguments; 
and Goldfield 1987, pp. 94-104, for a clear presentation of how some of these arguments 
are applied to the U.S. case. 
2
 Included in or closely related to this literature is the growing body of work that identifies 
a broad shift from Fordism to new models of "post-Fordist" production organization. Since 
the contours of this shift are contingent and remain unclear, I will speak here of rapid 
production and work reorganization but will avoid debatable characterizations such as 
"flexible specialization," "flexible automation," "neo-Fordism," and "lean production." 
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on ' 'democratic corporatism" have revealed persistent institutional dif-
ferences in national political economies and their profound consequences 
(Schmitter 1974, 1981; Wilensky 1976, 1983; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 
1979; Berger 1981; Goldthorpe 1984a; Katzenstein 1985). Second, the 
traditional industrial relations systems model, though theoretically weak, 
offers a useful conceptual map, pointing to the critical variables that shape 
industrial relations outcomes: markets, technologies, and power relations 
in society (Dunlop 1958). This model becomes more useful as modified 
and expanded by Thomas A. Kochan, Harry Katz, and Robert B. McKersie 
(1986) to become dynamic and to broaden the conceptual map to include 
the behavior of strategic actors. In the study of comparative industrial 
relations, my work builds in part on an earlier tradition that emphasizes 
the importance of national institutions (Commons 1934; Kassalow 1969).3 
Although the main focus here is on the place of unions in rapidly 
changing contemporary circumstances, the book is also a study of both 
labor and management, with implications for both (and much of the pri-
mary research consists of intensive interviews with managers as well as 
\\ union representatives). Industrial adjustment, perhaps the critical eco-
nomic task of our time in advanced industrial societies, appears to require 
a stable industrial relations settlement, whether this includes strong or 
weak, integrated or excluded unions. As a study of industrial relations in 
transition, this analysis aims to offer a lens through which to assess the 
. prospects of industrial adjustment and the effectiveness of managerial 
initiatives to reorganize work as well as the preconditions of union success. 
Most important, this is also a broader political study, analyzing the 
relative success or failure of contrasting modes of interest representation. 
The arbitrary distinction between industrial relations on one hand and the 
role of labor and business in politics on the other prevents us, I think, 
from looking clearly at either. Shop-floor battles spill over into national 
politics, and the policies pursued by dominant political coalitions shape 
labor-management relations at the firm and plant levels. The effects of 
market forces and institutional arrangements at work in the contemporary 
1 politics of work reorganization have profound implications for broader 
3
 It is clear, however, from the contemporary literature in international and comparative 
political economy that the world has changed tremendously in the past two decades. Tra-
ditional institutional perspectives appear narrow and static in the current context. The 
perspective offered here is thus a "new institutionalise' one (see Reshef and Murray 1988; 
Steinmo 1989), emphasizing both dynamic changes in the world economy and in national 
patterns of industrial relations and the continuing importance of particular institutions. This 
new institutionalism, however, should not be confused with the similarly named contem-
porary variant of neoclassical economics (see critique by Dugger 1990). 
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interest group representation, for national politics, for the success of 
industrial adjustment, and for the prospects of economic and political 
democracy. 
From Harmony to Disarray: Dynamic Postwar 
Industrial Relations 
In the preceding section, I asked what, if any, conditions are necessary 
for contemporary unions to succeed. A decade ago, different questions 
were being asked. Unions almost everywhere in Western Europe and North 
America were viewed as major actors in the political economy, benefactors 
of a long and respectable development paralleling the history of indus-
trialization; if questions were raised, they more likely pointed to excessive 
union power. In the aftermath of World War II, unions cashed in on their 
antifascist and anticonservative traditions, grew rapidly, and helped labor-
friendly governments hold or regain power in many Western democracies. 
If the Cold War undercut labor's plans for socialism and in many cases 
returned conservative governments to power in the 1950s, unions none-
theless dug in at the core of industrial structures and grew in numbers and 
influence in the years of rapid postwar economic growth. Theorists of 
industrial relations pointed to the integrative effects of (tamed) unions in 
industrial society and predicted harmonious economic development based 
on balancing interest group representation and stable labor-management 
relations (Dahrendorf 1959; Kerr et al. i960; Slichter, Healy, and Liv-
ernash i960; Ross and Hartman i960). 
But just as the ink dried on optimistic predictions of stability, labor 
flexed its muscles in new and unpredictable ways. In some countries, such 
as West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, labor-linked 
political parties returned to power, expanded the welfare state, and grap-
pled with labor's rising expectations in periods of inflation and stagflation. 
Elsewhere labor "exploded," rocking the country from end to end in 
France in 1968 before spending itself (and still contributing to "the long 
march of the French Left"; Johnson 1982); transforming an ineffective, 
fragmented labor movement in Italy in 1969 into an entrenched power 
within the factories (Salvati 1981). Wildcat strikes plagued industry every-
where from 1969 to 1973, even in such famously pacific countries with 
low strike rates as Sweden and West Germany. 
Criticizing the earlier theorists of harmony and integration, scholars in 
the 1970s wrote volumes on the "resurgence of class conflict" in Western 
Europe and North America (Aronowitz 1973; Crouch and Pizzorno 1978). 
Democracy at Work 
Industrialists in Italy, Britain, and elsewhere denounced labor's 4'exces-
sive" factory and political power. At the same time, a new body of 
academic literature on ''corporatism" emerged, to question liberal/plu-
ralist assumptions and point to the entrenched power of organized labor 
as well as business at the core of many Western political economies 
(Schmitter 1974; Wilensky 1976; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). 
The corporatist literature itself was often critical of the rigidity of hi-
erarchical interest group structures and peak bargaining among elites far 
from labor's rank and file and capital's small and medium-sized business 
sectors (Schmitter 1981, 1982). Although democratic corporatism in its 
various definitional incarnations was generally associated with good past 
economic performance (Schmidt 1982; Cameron 1984), powerful interest 
groups such as labor were often viewed as internally undemocratic and 
too unwieldy for the tasks of industrial adjustment in newly competitive 
world markets. By the mid-1980s, "Eurosclerosis" had become a catch-
word for industrial stagnation; Western Europe's social democracies, in 
this view, were too burdened by welfare state spending and interest group 
demands (especially from labor, the main promoter of both rising wages 
and state welfare spending) to shift resources rapidly toward research and 
development, new investment, and the reorganization of production, as 
world markets required (Olson 1982; Scott 1985). 
President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher led a 
resurgence of conservative economic policy that included cutbacks in the 
welfare state as well as direct and indirect challenges to the power and 
influence of organized labor. This time labor proved vulnerable. Instead 
of conflict, "explosions," growing strength, and the high-level bargaining 
of the previous two decades, unions braced themselves defensively. In 
several countries, such as Italy, Britain, and the United States, the decline 
of unions turned into a rout. Even after the deep recession of 1980-82 
passed and economic growth was reestablished, the decline of union in-
fluence continued in most societies and the terms of growth included a 
weaker role for organized labor in both the political arena and industrial 
relations. And even where labor appeared strongest and where union 
membership levels did not decline, serious challenges to labor's position 
were evident: in Sweden, centralized collective bargaining broke down 
and scholars wrote of the demise of the Swedish model; in West Germany, 
labor faced a new conservative regime committed to rolling back labor's 
conflict potential, and academicians developed their own theories of do-
mestic union decline or the breakdown of "neocorporatism" (Streeck 
1984b; Hoffman 1988; Hohn 1988). Studies of unions and crisis (Lange, 
Ross, and Vannicelli 1982; Gourevitch et al. 1984) were replaced by 
Introduction 
studies of unions in crisis (Marshall 1987; Hohn 1988; Miiller-Jentsch 
1988a). 
Why do unions now appear to face long-term secular decline in many 
industrial societies? Most of the answers offered fall into two broad group-
ings: explanations that emphasize general economic, industrial, and social 
change; and country-specific explanations, most often focusing on the 
behavior of managers and union leaders themselves or emphasizing chang-
ing domestic political relations and coalitions. 
In the simplest version of the general explanations, a shift in the locus 
of employment from manufacturing to services has undercut the traditional 
industrial bases of union strength (Freeman and Medoff 1984, pp. 221-
28). A related view has it that recent generations of young workers (many 
of them in service sectors) are more oriented toward individual than col-
lective concerns; in this view, unions are in part victims of their own 
success, and even the well-educated children of unionists perceive less of 
a need for unions today. Another argument emphasizes the rise of the 
new social movements: activist students and younger workers in industrial 
societies are more interested in peace, the environment, and gender and 
racial equality than they are in unions and traditional labor concerns, and 
the new social movements have everywhere cut into both the political 
influence of unions (by disrupting old coalitions) and the ability to organize 
on the shop floor (Dalton et al. 1984; Inglehart 1984; Heckscher 1988; 
Halfmann 1989). 
Important contributions to an understanding of broad, general trends 
have come from Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel (1984) in the 
United States and Horst Kem and Michael Schumann (1984) in West 
Germany. In these analyse^; changes in world markets and new technol-
ogies are driving the reorganization of production and the introduction of 
"new production concepts," which increasingly decentralize labor-
management negotiations and undermine traditional national bases of 
union strength ./In the United States, Piore and Sabel view " job-control 
unionism" as increasingly inappropriate, while Kern and Schumann see 
the decentralization of responsibility for production accompanied by a 
problematic shift of influence from unions to firm-identified works councils 
in West Germany. 
—-4n~every advanced industrial society, there are contemporary theorists 
who advance country-specific explanations for the decline of unions. In 
Italy, unions overstepped their power, lost touch with the rank and file, 
and were vulnerable to a management counterattack in economic recession; 
in France, Frangois Mitterrand and the socialists cleverly united with and 
drained off strength from the communists and their dominant labor fed-
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eration, and the competing unions continue to fight among themselves; in 
Britain, unions discredited themselves under a Labour government in the 
1978-79 ''Winter of Discontent," and Thatcher's subsequent firm grip 
on political power squashed labor's strength; and even in Sweden, cen-
tralized bargaining and "wage solidarity" have proven inappropriate in-
stitutional responses to new market challenges and the demands of young 
workers, leading to the breakdown of traditional bargaining with a still 
uncertain effect on the future influence of unions. 
In West Germany, a perceived decline of union influence is explained 
by the "dual system" (in which unions and works councils are legally 
distinct) and by the actions of unions themselves in transferring power to 
firm-oriented works councils (Hohn 1988; Hoffmann 1988). In the United 
States, union decline predates the contemporary period and is explained 
from the left as caused by offensives conducted by employers, "business 
unionism," and the fear on the part of entrenched union leaders of rank-
and-file mobilization (Goldfield 1987; Moody 1988; Parker and Slaughter 
1988); and from the right by excessive and obstructive union power (Rey-
nolds 1984). In the two most comprehensive and influential recent studies 
of industrial relations in the United States, greatest weight in explaining 
union decline is given to the anti-union behavior and ideology of American 
management, with insufficient union organizing effort or adaptation to 
new circumstances as a secondary cause (Freeman and Medoff 1984; 
Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986).4 
At the subnational level, there have been, in addition to broad and 
country-specific explanations, numerous studies in recent years of the 
decline of specific unions; these studies, rich in empirical data, generally 
produce explanations rooted in changing market circumstances in partic-
ular sectors, firms' strategies (ranging from product-segment decisions to 
union-avoidance strategies), and the behavior and structure of specific 
unions. But as with country-specific explanations, we are left with specific 
causes for what look like very general processes in modern advanced 
industrial society. 
There is some truth, of course, to all of these arguments, and a good 
deal of truth to many of them. But how do we sort through the vast 
patchwork of causal analysis? If broad, general causes are at work, are 
the country-specific accounts useful only as description of the workings 
of general economic and social forces within national contexts but invalid 
4
 See also Goldfield 1987, both for evidence supporting this interpretation and for a 
thorough discussion of various explanations for the decline of unions in the United States 
(pp. 94-H2). 
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in themselves as explanation! If country-specific arguments are valid, are 
the broader forces at work only a backdrop, a set of background 4'con-
textual variables"? 
The obvious answer is that a full explanation for the fate of contemporary 
unions requires reference to both sets of factors. But it is easy to get lost 
in the rich tapestry. It is possible, I think, to construct a parsimonious 
explanation for cross-national outcomes in industrial relations, one that 
both acknowledges the driving force of international economic and social 
changes and identifies the critical domestic institutions that shape con-
trasting national responses and outcomes. 
The Argument: Markets Matter but So Do Institutions 
The starting point for an analysis of the fate of unions in the current 
period is recognition that workers' interest representation has faced new 
challenges in the 1980s. Drawing on the work of Kern and Schumann 
(1984), Piore and Sabel (1984), Stephen S. Cohen and John Zysman 
(1987), Robert Gilpin (1987), and others such as the French "regulation" 
school, I begin with the perspective that in the past fifteen years, world 
markets and economic relationships have experienced a new dynamism. 
Markets have changed for a number of reasons, but perhaps the single 
most important factor has been the rise of Japan as a world-class industrial 
and exporting nation. Not only have Japanese products gained rapidly 
rising market shares across a whole range of industries throughout the 
advanced industrial world, but Japanese firms have developed innovative 
models for organizing production that are perhaps unrivaled in their ability 
to bring low-cost, high-quality products to market and to change product 
offerings rapidly in response to market changes. In addition, the rise of 
the newly industrializing countries (NICs, especially South Korea, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, and Brazil), the successful export 
strategies of firms in West Germany, Scandinavia, and northern Italy, and 
the "multinationalization" of American, European, and Japanese firms 
have put new pressure on world markets. 
Capitalist markets, of course, are neveFstatic: firms compete and many 
fail, new technologies require new skills while making old skills obsolete, 
workers are displaced. But in the past fifteen years, as Japanese, European, 
and NIC-based competitors have caught up with once dominant U.S. firms, 
and as the pace of microelectronic technological change has escalated, 
world markets have become increasingly interdependent and competitive. 
With the Japanese leading the way, the principal characteristic of the 
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current world economy is intensified market competition, in response to 
which firms everywhere have been forced to move at a pace unprecedented 
in the postwar period to introduce new technologies and reorganize 
production. 
"~~~A critical part of the reorganization of production and technological 
change is the reorganization of work;5 and this, for workers and their 
unions, is ''where the rubber meets the road."(Managerial strategies for 
reorganizing work in the recent period have presented unions with major 
new challenges at precisely the time when changing world markets and 
high unemployment in many countries have undercut the ability of unions 
to bargain for the steadily rising real wages that characterized most of the 
postwar period. To the politics of wage bargaining have been added the 
politics of work reorganization. Whereas in the past, unions (and their 
members) could be content to bargain for wages and benefits while "letting 
management manage," the new pace and content of work reorganization 
have challenged established shop-floor orders in ways that divide the work 
force (into the winners and losers of reorganization) and threaten estab-
lished bases of union influence.6 Developing responses to managerial re-
organization strategies, to protect workers' interests and defend union 
institutional security, has become a major preoccupation for unions every-
where in Western Europe and North America. 
Country-specific as well as comparative studies of unions in the 1980s 
make it clear that these broad changes in markets and the organization of 
production are forcing unions to adapt to similar new tasks and are driving 
change in industrial relations across a range of countries (Kochan 1985; 
Thelen 1987b; Golden and Pontusson 1991). Even where unions retain 
effectively centralized structures, as in Sweden and Germany, there is a 
5
 Reorganization of production here refers to firms' strategies to change what is produced 
and how (this includes sourcing decisions, supplier networks, product and process decisions, 
personnel policy, and so on). Reorganization of work (changes in job design, content, or 
technology) is one part of the reorganization of production. Although technological change 
is often an important part of work reorganization, work can be extensively reorganized 
without changes in technology. Technological change almost always requires changes in 
job content; when work is reorganized without changes in technology, new work organi-
zation often lays the groundwork for technological innovation. Thus although the focus 
here is on reorganization of work rather than technological change per se, there is a close 
relationship between the two. 
6
 Work reorganization in earlier periods has also upset shop-floor orders, creating winners 
and losers among the work force; note, for example, the 1960s "automation scare" in the 
United States. But whereas in the past unions generally faced incremental technological 
change that affected particular groups of workers (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash i960), 
unions and workers today face much more extensive and rapid reorganization, as we will 
see in the case studies beginning in Chapter 1. 
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broad trend toward the decentralization of bargaining. Managerial initia-
tives have forced unions to scramble for negotiations on pay protection, 
employment security, and retraining rights as trade-offs against the new 
shop-floor flexibility, and often the enhanced responsibility given workers, 
that management seeks. Because the specifics of work reorganization take 
place at the plant, local bargaining assumes critical new importance. And 
as the torch passes to local negotiators, national unions grapple with 
problems of their own identity and strength (Locke 1990a). 
In many, but not all, countries, these changes appear to be closely 
linked with problems of widespread union decline. Reorganization of work 
aims at higher productivity, which often means a work force reduced in 
size. Quality circles or problem-solving groups often accompany the re-
organization of work because one managerial goal in reorganization is to 
increase workers' input and commitment; but such groups provide a new 
forum for the expression of workers' interests outside established industrial 
relations channels. The increased importance of plant-level bargaining has 
enabled managers to extract new concessions by playing one plant off 
against another (both domestically and internationally). And in many 
cases, managerial initiatives to reorganize work have been accompanied 
by direct challenges to union influence, as firms find it necessary to push 
aside old restrictive union power on the shop floor. Analysts in countries 
such as Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States have linked all 
these processes to the decline of unions. 
Given these general processes at work, country-specific analyses that 
emphasize, for example, managerial ideology or particular union strategies 
within a particular nation become less convincing, at least as full causal 
explanations. It stretches the imagination to believe that unions have de-
clined in numbers and influence across a whole range of industrial societies 
in the past decade but for quite different reasons within each country. It 
makes more sense to argue that general economic changes, including 
intensified market competition and managerial imperatives to reorganize 
production, have driven widespread processes of change in industrial re-
lations, which in many cases have included union decline. 
In many cases, but not all. There have been, in fact, substantial, em-
pirical, cross-national differences in the performance of unions since the 
early 1980s. Theorists of union decline in Germany and Sweden, for 
example, are quite wrong when their arguments are looked at from a cross-
national perspective. By almost any measure—union membership levels 
or density, bargaining gains, institutional stability—unions have not de-
clined in these countries. They have had to grapple with new problems, 
develop new strategies, and make organizational adaptations, but they 
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have not seriously declined in influence as unions in France, Italy, Britain, 
and the United States have done. So the question becomes, why not? Why 
have unions in some countries declined precipitously in the face of new 
external and shop-floor circumstances, while unions in other countries 
have held their own and adapted? 
The answer offered here, and the argument that will be tested with 
evidence, is that the key to an explanation for contrasting, cross-national 
union outcomes in the present period lies in the way interest representation 
is institutionalized, or more precisely, the structures that represent work-
ers* interests. 
In particular, two critical variables account for relative union success 
or decline and the stability of industrial relations systems in the contem-
porary period: first, the extent to which unions, as a broad national pattern, 
are integrated into processes of managerial decision making, especially 
concerning work reorganization; and second, the existence of laws or 
corporatist bargaining arrangements that regulate firm-level union partic-
ipation from outside the firm. 
^ Where unions enter the current period of work reorganization already 
^ integrated into processes of managerial decision making, as in West Ger-
many and Japan, union influence remains stable, a¥do patterns of industrial 
"relations in general.7 This is true because agreement Is required before 
change can be implemented, and agreement between labor and manage-
ment ensures labor's stable place, even if work reorganization is 
far-reaching. Because labor is integrated at the level of the firm, union 
representatives or works councillors participate in decision making that 
considers both market imperatives to reorganize work and the viability of 
the representation of workers' interests. 
But it also makes a big difference whether labor's integration into 
managerial decision making is backed up by law or corporatist bargaining 
arrangements, which include a cohesive labor movement. When this is 
true (as in West Germany), labor participates in firms' decision making 
from a base that is independent of management; unions are in a position 
to assess the needs of the work force and market requirements indepen-
7
 Stability in Japanese industrial relations includes a modest decline in union member-
ship density, from 32% of the nonagricultural work force in 1979 to 28% in 1986 (Free-
man 1989, p. 130). But the essential labor-management relationship (enterprise unions, 
management-led integration) remains unchanged. Japan fits into this analysis somewhat 
awkwardly because the success of Japanese production models, including teamwork and 
enterprise unionism, is a driving force destabilizing industrial relations systems in the other 
countries examined. But Japanese industrial relations are nonetheless included among the 
cases to be explained because Japanese unions must cope, as is true in all other advanced 
industrial societies, with ongoing and intense work reorganization. 
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dently and to bring a new perspective to the discussions and perhaps 
even an independent, worker-oriented vision of the shape of new work 
organization. Most important, statutory or corporatist regulation narrows 
managerial discretion concerning both work reorganization and union in-
tegration, which allows for a more stable and extensive union role. Both 
management and labor, at the firm and plant levels, are pushed from 
without toward collaboration on issues such as new ways of organizing 
work. 
By contrast, where no such statutory or bargaining arrangements exist 
and the labor movement is fragmented (as in Japan), the union has little 
independent basis from which to develop its own information and analysis. 
^ / B e c a u s e statutory or corporatist regulation is not present, managerial dis-
r >cretion is wider; collaboration that occurs does so on management's terms 
y/W (Japan, numerous plant-level cases in the United States, Britain, and Italy). 
Weak labor is integrated into managerial decision making in a decidedly 
subordinate way. \ 
Where unions^rrnot integrated into firms' decision making, usually 
because of adversarial or arm's-length labor-management traditions, 
worker representatives have no solid position from which to influence the 
shape of work reorganization (except indirectly through threats to file 
grievances, fail to cooperate, and strike). Consideration of the institutional 
interests of unions tend to be left out of the discussion in these cases, and 
often work reorganization aims explicitly at the reduction of union 
influence. 
But where corporatist bargaining arrangements exist, unions can use 
broad political and economic influence to gain new integration into de-
cision making at the firm level, in a period when such integration appears 
critical for continued union success. This is exactly what happened in 
Sweden beginning in the mid-1970s. 
The real problems come for unions in countries where labor is not 
integrated into managerial decision making and there are no appropriate 
laws or corporatist bargaining structures. In these cases, labor has little 
political leverage to push for a new national pattern of engagement; in-
tegration that occurs does so on the basis of a single firm or plant, often 
as a result of management prodding and major union concessions, thus 
raising the specter of weak enterprise unionism. Where managers perceive 
unions to be standing in the way of work reorganization, unions have no 
societywide base to prevent either direct challenges to their influence or 
strategies to move around unions and marginalize their influence. Thus 
in France, Italy, Britain, and the United States, unions have declined 
seriously in influence in the past decade; and this is true whether they 
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were relatively strong at the end of the 1970s (Italy and Britain) or already 
in decline (France and the United States). 
At first glance, there is an apparent tautology in this argument, with 
the representation of workers' interests on both sides of the equation. 
Looked at more carefully, however, the tautology disappears. There are 
different ways in which such representation can be institutionalized; since 
the economic crisis years of the mid- to late 1970s, some of these ways 
have proven more conducive than others to the persistence of stable in-
dustrial relations and union influence. Structures are on one side of the 
equation, stability and influence on the other side. As noted at the begin-
ning of this chapter, this argument runs counter to received wisdom in 
the United States, which held that both adversarial, arm's-length unionism 
and decentralized, competitive organizing were most conducive to the 
expansion of union influence (and this may well have been true in the 
early postwar period). 
Linked to this argument is the fact that industrial relations systems in 
countries such as Germany and Japan appear highly compatible with eco-
nomic and competitive success (Streeck 1987a). Although it is beyond 
the scope of this study to test such a linkage (because there are so many 
factors that contribute to market success), plant- and firm-level industrial 
relations that integrate unions into managerial decision making appear to 
contribute to the micro-foundations of economic success. The case studies 
will strengthen this speculation. In a sense, then, this argument includes 
an "intervening variable": particular structures of interest representation, 
in part because they contribute to favorable production outcomes, ensure 
stable industrial relations and union influence in the contemporary period. 
The advantage of this argument is that it allows us to move from the 
driving economic changes at work in the world economy to work reor-
ganization at the levels of the firm and shop floor, which is necessary to 
compete in today's markets, by way of the institutions of industrial re-
lations that shape country-specific options for reorganization and determine 
the relative stability and influence of unions in the new era. This analysis 
links the fate of unions and industrial relations systems directly to world 
economic changes, through the prism of country-specific institutional 
mechanisms. From the perspective of comparative union success or de-
cline, these linkages make sense of broad economic trends affecting all 
contemporary unions: the impact varies substantially depending on how 
interest representation is structured. 
Another advantage of this argument is that, if true, it shows what unions 
must do to reverse widespread decline: they must abandon or overcome 
arm's-length traditions and get integrated into processes of managerial 
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decision making. But it also shows the risks: where unions are not backed 
up by appropriate laws or corporatist bargaining, there is a clear danger 
that they will be subordinated to management. 
Definitions and Hypotheses 
A useful way to gauge relative union success as well as the stability^f iiv 
dustrial relations is to examine cross-nationally the stability and extent of 
workers' interestjepresentation. In some countries, unions alone represent 
workers' interests; in other countries, both unions and works councils are 
present. The propeoubject for cross-national analysis is thus workers' 111-
tei^sLrepresejUation rathenthan unions ^ although the lattertermalong with 
phrases.suchMi^'miataeJuniojOLsuccess'' will be used here, as it is else-
where in the literature, as shorthand in cross-national discussions. 
The stability and extent of workers' interest representation in an era of / 
ongoing work reorganization can be measured along three dimensions: \ 
first, stability or change in the density of union membership in the time I 
period examined (1982-89); second, the pay, employment, and protection I 
of status afforded union members against the effects of technological ; 
change and work reorganization; and third, the credible promotion of an 
independent union perspective on the content or shape of new work or-
ganization. 
Thejirst dimension is an important quantitative measure of the relative 
ability of unions to hold on to rates of membership^&nd membership rates 
have a great deal to do with union influence. Thes^econd dirnension reflects 
the reactive capacities of unions: the ability to respond to managerial 
initiative and effectively defend workers' interests. The third dimension 
reflects unions' proactive capacities: the ability to formulate and bargain 
for alternative worker-oriented forms of organization. This last dimension \ ^ 
is fairly new in the history of postwar unionism, but it is a capacity that 
unions throughout North America and Western Europe are seeking to 
develop in the face of rapid technological change and work reorganization. 
The stability and extent of workers' interest representation, as indicated ~^1 t^ ff3 
along these three dimensions, can best be examined within particular 
industry sectors (which: is where work reorganization takes place). The^i 
first dimension is a quantitative measure that can be taken from available 
data. The second and third dimensions can be assessed in part on the basis 
of contracts, agreements, and documents; but to a_significant extent these 4 $ ^ 
dimemsion^^ only by means^ofcase•studies that 
demonstrate the_extent in practice of protections afforded and alternatives 
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promoted. Ideally_2a range of representative case s.tudi&s..deinonstrates the 
^bilityjin^extent of workers' interest representation at the sectooiicvel; 
sectoralj^com cross-nationally. 
What is critical for this argument, of course, is that cross-national 
sectoral comparisons translate into general cross-national comparisons. It 
is necessary, therefore, to look at more than one sector. If it turns out 
that there are no general national patterns, then the argument advanced 
here, based on national structures of interest representation, is wrong. 
As for the structures themselves, integration into managerial decision 
making is defined here as substantial participation on the part of unions 
or works councils in discussions with management regarding plans to 
reorganize work before actual decisions are made on the shape of new 
organization and the pace of implementation. Integration into managerial 
decision making is juxtaposed to arm's-length unionism, in which unions 
receive little advance information or opportunities for input; in these latter 
cases, ''advance information" usually means after the final decision but 
before implementation, and the union role is to react to independent man-
agerial decisions. 
Laws that regulate union participation are products of national legis-
lation that establishes a legal framework to encourage and regulate, from 
outside the firm, union integration into managerial decision making. Ger-
many's Works Constitution Act passed in 1952 and strengthened in 1972 
is an example (although the original intent of the legislation was to en-
courage participation by workers rather than unions). The point here con-
cerns not just any legislation but Jaws_that_give workers j u ^ unions 
substantial^ghts to participate. As we. .wi l lsee^ 
a labor m^^ ^ in proactive ways (the weak 
participation legislation adopted in France in 1945, for example, withered 
on the vine because of union hostility or neglect; Lorwin 1954; Stephens 
and^tqphens 1982, p. 230). 
Corporatist bargaining is here defined as regularized peak or subpeak 
negotiation between relatively cohesive units of business and labor, with 
the formal or informal backing of the state. This concept builds on the 
work, over the past fifteen years, of a variety of theorists of "corpora-
tism," "neocorporatism," and "democratic corporatism." J h e central 
^gigJ?lMJbi^^eraIUIg--LS that there are, among industrial democracies, 
different typesof poUtical^ecgnomies^^ ranging from the more pluralist (the 
United States, Britain) to the more corporatist (Sweden, Austria, and 
Norway), and that thesejdiffeient structures greatly influence political and 
economic outcomes.8 
8
 There are about as many definitions of democratic corporatism as there are theorists 
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For the encouragement and regulation of union and worker participation 
in management, a cohesive labor movement is the dynamic element within 
a structure of corporatist bargaining. A cohesive labor movement is one 
that includes a relatively small number of national unions and is effec-
tively, if not formally, centralized, either through a dominant central labor 
federation or through the centralizing influence of one dominant union. 
A formally centralized labor federation has the power to make binding 
decisions for national unions; this is not necessarily the case for a cohesive 
labor movement, in which central authority may be less well defined. A 
cohesive labor movement is a broader category, including but not limited 
to centralized labor movements.9 A cohesive labor movement is juxtaposed 
to a fragmented one, in which either labor is divided into contending, 
plural union federations, or authority is highly decentralized within a single 
federation.10 
Summarized, the above discussion offers the following hypotheses, 
suitable for cross-national comparative analysis (applicable to advanced 
industrial societies in the contemporary period of work reorganization): 
1. Where unions or works councils, as a broad national pattern, are integrated 
into managerial decision making, representation of workers' interests remains 
stable in the recent period of major work reorganization. 
2. Everywhere else, where unions have arm's-length traditions of various 
kinds, organized labor experiences declining influence with the onset of major 
of the subject, and indeed conceptual confusion has undermined some of the value of the 
literature. It is beyond the scope of this book to enter into specifics of the definitional 
debate; nor is it my purpose to make this another study of corporatism. What I do is to 
draw on some of the insights of this literature to formulate definitions and to argue that 
differences in the structure of political economy matter for union outcomes in the contem-
porary period. For those interested in the recent literature on corporatism, some of the most 
important works are Schmitter 1974; Wilensky 1976 and 1983; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 
1979; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Berger 1981; Goldthorpe 1984a; and Katzenstein 
1985. 
9
 A cohesive labor movement is a comparative category that is not inconsistent with 
intraclass or intra-labor-movement conflict and division. There is conflict between unions 
just as there are relative winners and losers within any labor movement (see Markovits 
1986 on the "activists" and "accommodationists" within the West German labor move-
ment; and Swenson 1989 and 1990 on labor divisions in the early processes of corporatist 
labor inclusion). 
10
 There are thus two types of cohesive labor movements, those that are formally cen-
tralized (Sweden) and those that are not (Germany). There are also two types of fragmented 
labor movements, plural unionist (France and Italy) and highly decentralized (the United 
States, Britain, and Japan). Although Japan has both contending federations and extreme 
decentralization, the latter is the most salient defining characteristic. For a useful compar-
ative discussion of centralized labor movements in West Germany and Sweden, see Swenson 
1989, pp. 31-34. Swenson contrasts these labor movements to the more fragmented ones 
found in the United States and Britain (pp. 20-21). 
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work reorganization, unless unions participate in regularized arrangements of 
corporatist bargaining. In the latter cases, a cohesive labor movement can use its 
broad political and economic clout to organize a new integration of labor into 
managerial decision making. 
There are two important corollaries to the first hypothesis: 
i a. Where unions are integrated into management decision-making processes 
and where such participation is backed by statutory and corporatist regulation (as 
in West Germany), union or works council influence remains significant from a 
base that is substantially independent of management. 
ib. Where union integration into firms' decision-making processes lacks the 
backing of statutory or corporatist regulation (as in Japan), union voice has no 
platform from which to be substantially independent of management. 
And the second hypothesis also has a corollary: 
2a. Where organized workers are neither integrated into managerial decision 
making to begin with nor part of corporatist bargaining arrangements (including 
a cohesive labor movement), unions have no society wide leverage from which 
to negotiate for integration into management decision making—as Swedish unions 
did in the 1970s and 1980s. Union integration that does occur at the plant and 
firm levels is usually a result of managerial prodding and often includes major 
union concessions of traditional bases of influence, thus presenting the danger of 
subordinate enterprise unionism and making unions suspicious of further col-
laboration. 
The Evidence Required 
Managerial initiatives and union responses in the politics of work re-
organization have developed and increased in importance in the past ten 
to fifteen years. Testing the argument presented here, therefore, requires 
above all getting inside firm- and plant-level negotiations and conflict over 
work reorganization, to examine the interactions between management 
and labor, the role of unions, the stability and extent of workers' interest 
representation, and the causes for contrasting outcomes. 
Overall union decline, of course, is based only in part on the weakening 
of union influence in its established bases. It is here that I concentrate in 
this analysis. But union decline is also a product of the inability to organize 
the unorganized in growing sectors (which in turn is related to a shift in 
employment and investment away from traditional unionized sectors). That 
is not where this research is focused; but I think the argument would in 
any case apply. In the contemporary period, union organizing efforts are 
arguably facilitated both by corporatist bargaining arrangements and by 
legal frameworks to regulate and encourage union participation in man-
agement decision making. 
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But if unions are in decline everywhere in contemporary industrial 
societies, as much of the country-specific as well as the general literature 
implies, then an argument based on cross-national contrasts and country-
specific institutions of interest representation is misplaced. The first task 
is thus one of discovery: to find out whether in fact substantial cross-
national differences exist in the stability and extent of the representation 
of workers interests. This can be accomplished by a study of contemporary 
industrial relations in one key sector of two national economies, backed 
up by secondary studies of other sectors in each of the two countries." 
The first task dovetails nicely with the second and third tasks. The 
second task is to examine in depth the substance of labor-management 
relations and negotiations concerning work reorganization in the selected 
sector of the two countries to assess contrasting outcomes and determine 
whether the argument presented here is consistent with the facts. 
As core cases, I have chosen to look at the U.S. and West German 
auto industries in the postrecession years 1982-89. In the United States, 
by all accounts, unions in general have experienced seriously declining 
membership and influence in the past decade; in West Germany, unions 
appear, at least from the outside, to be much stronger by comparison. 
The automobile industry in both countries remains a critical sector at the 
center of the respective national economies; and auto workers' unions in 
both countries have traditionally played pattern-setting roles within their 
respective national labor movements. 
Examjnin .^Jh£-_politics of work reorganization in the U.S. and West 
German auto industries requires looking at a range of represent&ji^^ 
leveLc^ Cases can then be compared cross-
nationally, but most important, the range of outcomes (and the general 
national pattern, if there is one) can be compared. In this book, the focus 
is on the auto assembly plants of high-volume, mass-market producers: 
in West Germany, Volkswagen (VW), Opel, and Ford (with a background 
look at Daimler-Benz); in the United States, the dominant firm, General 
Motors (GM) (with a background look at Ford and Chrysler). In West 
" Ideally, to test an argument of this scope, numerous sectors in several countries should 
be studied; both the sectors and the general national patterns should then be compared 
cross-nationally. But this would require the work of a team of researchers for several years. 
The present study has thus focused empirical research on one critical sector in two countries, 
and the findings of this research are broadened by way of background studies both of other 
sectors within the two countries and the critical sector in several other countries. In recent 
literature, many have argued in favor of industry studies (rather than broad studies of the 
economy or of national labor federations), since the sector or firm is generally the locus 
both of industrial development and of national union power (see Zysman and Tyson 1983; 
Bean 1985, pp. 13-15)-
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Germany, where plants are larger in size and smaller in number, I look 
at both Opel assembly plants, both Ford assembly plants, and the dominant 
VW assembly plant at Wolfsburg. In the United States, I examine five 
GM plants, chosen to represent a range of contrasting outcomes. The 
empirical presentations and analysis of the politics of work reorganization 
in the U.S. and West German auto industries, in Chapters i and 2 re-
spectively and in Chapter 3, where the two national cases are systemat-
ically compared, together make up the largest portion of this book. 
The third task is to broaden the sample beyond the auto industry in both 
the United States and West Germany, to determine whether more general 
national patterns exist and whether the argument is generalizable beyond 
one sector. This is done in Chapter 4, with a study of contemporary 
industrial relations in telecommunications (and specifically, telephone ser-
vices) in both countries, based on primary research and secondary material, 
and a study of industrial relations in the apparel industries of each country, 
based on secondary material. These industries are chosen to provide useful 
counterpoints to the auto industry, given very different market circum-
stances and industry and union structures. And as James Kurth (1979) has 
argued, apparel was historically a key component of the first stage of 
industrialization (the ''textiles" stage); the automobile industry has been 
the critical sector since about World War I; and telecommunications is 
the most logical candidate to lead the next major stage of industrial de-
velopment. If general national patterns of industrial relations can be dis-
covered that apply to all three of these very different sectors in the 
contemporary era, we can perhaps be reasonably confident of the general 
nature of the findings.12 
The fourth task is to move the analysis beyond two countries, to see if 
a more general argument is supported. In Chapter 5, the politics of work 
reorganization in the auto industries of Sweden, Italy, Great Britain, and 
Japan is considered, based on available secondary material. In addition, 
I assess general trends in industrial relations in these four countries. Look-
ing at developments in additional countries is a critical step in broadening 
the evidence to assess the relative merits of various arguments, including 
this one.13 
121 am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for pointing out to me that the three industrial sectors 
I had selected fit nicely into Kurth's product cycle framework, thereby strengthening the 
plausibility and general applicability of this argument. 
'
3
 Bean (1985) and Dogan and Pelassy (1990) both argue that two-country ("bipolar") 
analyses are useful for the depth of comparison they allow, but that a broader framework 
is necessary to isolate explanatory variables and avoid false generalizations (Bean 1985, 
p. 13; Dogan and Pelassy 1990, pp. 126-30). 
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The final task is to assemble the evidence and draw out conclusions. 
In the final chapter, the hypotheses presented here are tested against the 
combined evidence from the previous five chapters; in both Chapter 3 and 
the Conclusion, other country-specific and general arguments are consid-
ered in light of the evidence produced. 
The concluding chapter presents a discussion of the implications of this 
argument: for the literature; for theory-building; for unions, firms, and 
governments and their respective policy choices; for the comparative pros-
pects of industrial adjustment; and for industrial and political democracy. 
J 
Preview: The Evidence Discovered 
The core research for this book consists of case studies of work reor-
ganization and industrial relations in the U.S. and West German auto 
industries from 1982 to 1989. Findings of these case studies, generalized 
into sector-level patterns, can be summarized as follows. 
The period since 1982 has been characterized by major managerial 
initiatives at reorganizing work in the U.S. auto industry in the face of 
persistent and successful Japanese competition. Most evident and perhaps 
most important as well have been conflicts and negotiations around the 
introduction of various forms of teamwork in many large U.S. auto plants. 
Managerial initiatives and union and work-force responses have resulted 
in a wide range of outcomes, from new nonunion plants, to plants with 
conflictual and still traditional industrial relations, to plants with traditional 
but more cooperative industrial relations, and finally to plants in which 
team organization is accompanied by an integration of the union into new 
levels of managerial decision making. The latter cases offer variants on 
a new model for the U.S. auto industry, in which more cooperative labor-
management relations are combined with a more flexible deployment of 
labor in teams or groups and a union actively engaged in processes of 
managerial decision making. Although there are plant-level cases of suc-
cess for such a model (at GM's Plant #1 in Lansing, Michigan, and at 
the GM-Toyota NUMMI plant in Fremont, California, for example, which 
are examined in Chapter 1) a common pattern includes heavy (and often 
counterproductive) managerial challenges to union influence, accompanied 
by labor-management and intraunion/work-force conflict and a very rocky, 
uneven road to work reorganization. Because the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) entered this period with no entrenched position within processes 
of managerial decision making, managers in the auto industry have had 
wide discretion in their strategies for the implementation of new work 
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organization; and it is precisely this wide discretion that best accounts for 
the remarkably wide range of current industrial relations and work reor-
ganization outcomes in the U.S. auto industry.14 Although market cir-
cumstances cry out for a new plant-level model of organization, the 
successful spread of such a model is undermined by persistent old-
fashioned managerial thinking and practice (including authoritarian shop-
floor approaches and a broader pattern of adversarial management).I5 The 
UAW, in 1984, 1987, and 1990 contract negotiations, broke new ground 
in protecting autoworkers against the effects of reorganization, but these 
gains remained modest in comparison to parallel protections for unions 
in West Germany. Union membership in the auto industry declined after 
1979 both absolutely and as a percentage of the industry organized.16 Not 
coincidentally, I would suggest, the U.S. auto industry taken as a whole 
(and this is especially true for the dominant firm, GM) has adapted only 
slowly to the major competitive challenges from Japan and elsewhere. 
In the West German auto industry, work reorganization has proceeded 
steadily in the past decade, and although management initiative has dom-
inated, the shape of reorganization has resulted from a process of nego-
tiation between company drives for "rationalization" and demands from 
unions and works councils for "humanization of work." Labor-
management relations have been stable; the influence of unions and works 
councils is strong and steady in the plants (as indicated by the three 
dimensions of workers' interest representation); works councils have a 
voice at various levels of management decision making and engage in a 
daily process of negotiation regarding the allocation of labor. Union mem-
bership in the industry is high and stable, both absolutely and as a per-
centage of the industry work force, and nonunionism is not an option in 
the German auto industry. New forms of team and group work are now 
looming rapidly on the horizon, over groundwork laid by the gradual 
14
 The UAW itself remains rather centralized, engaging in pattern-setting collective 
bargaining at the national level with GM, Ford, and Chrysler. But because the U.S. labor 
movement as a whole is organizationally fragmented, unions in many industries have proven 
vulnerable to attack or exclusion in the 1980s. Labor's decline has emboldened managers 
even where unions are strongest, as in the auto industry, and this is reflected in the wide 
range of plant-level strategies and outcomes. 
15
 The main problem, the evidence here suggests, is not job-control unionism, as Katz 
and Sabel (1985) and others have implied. At plant after plant, workers (usually under 
pressure) have proven willing to give up job classifications in return for promises of new 
participation—only to return from training programs to the shop floor, where their raised 
expectations are dashed by old-fashioned managerial ways (Milkman and Pullman 1988; 
Turner 1988b). 
16
 The decline in the organization rate has two sources: the nonunion Japanese transplants 
and the declining rate of organization in the parts-supplier branch of the industry. 
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introduction of quality circles and group work (Gruppenarbeit) pilot proj-
ects in several plants. The entrenched position of works council and union 
in the plants and the projection of an independent union vision of the 
nature of group work means that teamwork is coming to the German auto 
industry in a very different way from in the United States. Here it is 
primarily the Metalworkers Union (IG Metall),'7 with its own indepen-
dently developed, detailed concepts and strategies for new work organi-
zation, that has promoted group work, and only since about 1985 has 
management begun to press for its own new concept, a more Japanese-
style team approach. Teamwork is coming to the German auto industry 
in the negotiations between these two strong and contending views. Vari-
ations within the relatively narrow range of outcomes can best be accounted 
for by variations in firms' strategies (based on differing firm characteristics, 
such as the position of Ford-Werke and Opel as part of worldwide Ford 
and GM, and the unique history of VW) and in works council strategies 
(a product, for example, of Geschlossenheit or unity at VW, compared 
to the existence of contending factions at Opel-Bochum); but the differ-
ences across plants and firms are small compared to the United States. 
Both the smallness of the range and the stable influence of union and 
works councils are best explained by the entrenched position of works 
councils within the plants, backed by the Works Constitution Act, and 
the inclusion of a relatively cohesive labor movement (in which the IG 
Metall retains a central position) within a broader framework of unique, 
West German corporatist bargaining. Within this institutional framework, 
the West German auto industry adapted very well to increasingly com-
petitive market circumstances at home and abroad in the 1980s. 
This analysis should not be interpreted either as belittling the recent 
accomplishments of the UAW (such as the creation of job banks and 
expanded employment security) or as overlooking the difficult and growing 
problems faced by the IG Metall. The UAW has remained a pattern setter 
and innovator for the U.S. labor movement, and if a new U.S. model of 
industrial relations emerges that promotes both market success and new 
union vitality it may well come out of the many labor-management ex-
periments currently under way in the auto industry. At the same time, the 
IG Metall faced high and enduring unemployment in West Germany as 
well as new managerial aggressiveness in issues such as flexibility of 
working hours and work reorganization. A shift in the locus of influence 
17
 The full name is Industriegewerkschaft Metall, which translates literally as "industrial 
union for the metal industries." In Germany, the union is known simply as IG Metall, and 
it will be referred to as such here as well. The IG Metall organizes several industries, 
including autos. 
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to the works councils arguably contributed to a new "plant syndicalism" 
(Hohn 1988), which has made it possible for German managers to begin 
to learn the art (well developed at U.S. auto firms) of playing one plant's 
work force (and works council) off against another. The strength of em-
ployers in this regard may well increase with the opening up of East 
Germany. Both German unification and the coming of the single European 
market pose new and potentially serious problems for German unions. 
But the cross-national outcomes in the 1980s did contrast rather sharply, 
and these differences make clear the very real constraints faced by the 
UAW—regardless of leadership decisions or strategy. In the contemporary 
U.S. industrial relations climate, the UAW's efforts may in fact be a best-
case scenario. This is clear from a brief look at the telephone services 
and apparel industries, which together bring out well the broad (as opposed 
to industry- or firm-specific) nature of the U.S.-West German contrast. 
In both cases, the patterns are similar: West German unions increase 
membership density in the face of organizational reform efforts (telephone 
services) or adverse market circumstances (apparel) and hold on to im-
portant levers of influence; U.S. unions face declining membership density 
and struggle to replace lost influence in new ways. Parallel contrasts 
between the United States and West Germany can thus be seen across a 
range of industries, regardless of market circumstances, firm or union 
structure, or role played in histories of product cycle development. 
The argument presented here is largely confirmed by a cross-national 
comparison of industrial relations in the auto industries in the United 
States, West Germany, Britain, Italy, Sweden, and Japan. It seems to be 
a particular characteristic of current markets and technologies that man-
agers need more cooperation and problem-solving input from employees 
at all levels of the firm; and managers can get this cooperation either by 
completely excluding unions or by integrating unions or works councils 
into their decision making in new ways. The relative lack of constraints 
on managerial strategies for reorganizing work in societies where orga-
nized labor is fragmented and has no established access to firms' decision-
making processes often tempts managers into direct challenges to union 
influence, setting in motion a conflictual process that undermines the 
prospects for new trust and cooperation (whether unions are successfully 
excluded or remain entrenched). This was precisely the dynamic at work 
in the U.S. auto industry in the 1980s, and one could see a parallel process 
at work in the British and Italian auto industries. In West Germany and 
Sweden, by contrast, increasingly integrated autoworker unions backed 
up by statutory regulation and cohesive labor movements constrained 
management in ways conducive both to stable labor-management bar-
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gaining over the shape of new work organization and to the stability and 
expanded influence of workers' interest representation.18 In Japan, labor 
integration into management processes has meant stability for auto industry 
unions, although a fragmented labor movement and the absence of legal 
regulation have allowed management to dominate discussions and kept 
unions from presenting an independent viewpoint or from reversing a 
modest but steady society wide decline. 
Industrial Relations Settlements and the Conditions for 
Contemporary Union Success 
Methodologically, this analysis is situated between broad, general anal-
yses that tend to be determinist (whether Marxist or liberal; see Goldthorpe 
1984b) and arguments that locate explanations only in the unique and 
detailed circumstances of particular countries. This latter perspective is 
found in a current body of insightful studies in which industry structures, 
social patterns, and industrial relations are woven into a social fabric that 
produces unique outcomes in each country (Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 
1986; Sorge and Warner 1987). My view is that though these studies 
usefully depict processes at work in particular countries, it is nonetheless 
possible to locate critical variables (not everything is equally important) 
that contribute to cross-national causal explanation. 
In other words, countries respond in contrasting ways to the same 
challenges and tasks because different institutions are in place; yet it is 
possible to group countries according to a limited number of outcomes 
(in this case concerning the stability of industrial relations and relative 
union success) and to explain these outcomes with reference to selected 
variables. This analysis thus falls in with those that see distinct national 
models linked to distinct patterns of outcomes. Zysman (1983), for ex-
ample, offers one approach that is broadly consistent with the findings 
presented here: a "bargained solution" in West Germany and Sweden is 
contrasted to a "company-led" model of industrial adjustment in the 
United States and Britain and a "state-led" model in France and Japan. 
In the first model, labor is included in negotiations; in the last two, labor 
is excluded. The neo- or democratic corporatist theorists afford another 
important example, in which countries are grouped into two or three 
18
 This argument parallels and is complementary to Streeck's argument that union or 
works council-imposed labor market rigidities drive employers upmarket toward "diver-
sified, high quality production," with positive results both for competitiveness and for the 
continued influence of workers' interest representation (Streeck 1985a, 1987a). 
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categories along corporatist/pluralist dimensions (Schmitter 1974; Wil-
ensky 1976; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). But to the extent that these 
theorists are anti-corporatist (Schmitter 1982, p. 261) or emphasize un-
stable institutional rigidities (Sabel 1981; Streeck 1984b), the present 
analysis diverges. "Bargained" or "democratic corporatist"19 political 
economies on the whole showed remarkable institutional stability in the 
turbulent years from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, and this was par-
ticularly true for the structures representing workers' interests. 
Perhaps most important, the findings presented here shed light on do-
mestic debates regarding unions and on country-specific analyses of union 
decline. In West Germany, for example, numerous scholars shared the 
perspective in the 1980s that unions were in serious trouble, facing the 
threat of either "Japanization" or "Americanization" (Streeck 1984b; 
Hoffmann 1988). The problem was that some of these theorists had un-
realistic expectations: they expected the West German labor movement to 
adhere to an old program for the transformation of society and "unitary 
unionism" that may be increasingly out-of-date (Hohn 1988). West Ger-
man unions have adapted to new tasks and challenges and are stable in 
numbers and influence, both in comparative perspective and along a num-
ber of measurable dimensions; German analysts looking for the decline 
of unions would do better to look beyond their own borders. 
There is, however, a conservative or neoliberal view in West Germany 
that unions are too strong and are standing in the way of industrial ad-
justment. This view was reflected in the Kohl regime's legislative chal-
lenge to union strike power (see below, Chapter 2) and in the Lafontaine 
current within the Social Democratic party (SPD) that called into question 
some of labor's most sacred cows (such as the free weekend). From a 
comparative perspective, West German unions are indeed influential; yet 
this influence appears to be flexible and considerably more in tune with 
the adjustment needs of industry than is true of unions in many other 
countries (Streeck 1987a; Thelen 1987b). 
In the United States, there is widespread debate about the causes and 
consequences of union decline. The findings here confirm in part the path-
breaking studies by Richard Freeman and James L. Medoff (1984), Ko-
19
 The term is not precise and has been subject to a variety of definitions; especially 
controversial is its applicability to the West German case. But in both structure (centralized, 
inclusive interest representation) and behavior (labor-management peace bargain, extensive 
bilateral and trilateral negotiation throughout the political economy), Germany is closest 
to the smaller, more clearly corporatist societies such as Sweden, Norway, and Austria 
(Katzenstein 1985, 1987). Thus Wilensky (1983) places West Germany "on the margins 
of democratic corporatism." 
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chan, Katz, and McKersie (1986), and Michael Goldfield (1987) that locate 
the primary source of this decline in managerial values and growing em-
ployer opposition to unions (or the capitalist offensive, as Goldfield puts 
it). But from a comparative perspective, I argue that managerial tactics 
and strategies of opposition to unions are successful precisely because of 
the absence of particular institutional forms of constraint. Opel and Ford 
managers in West Germany, for example, have in the past also acted on 
"American" values and strategies (not least because these are American-
owned firms); yet the effect has not been to interfere with the expansion 
of union influence. Thus the way in which union influence is institution-
alized, not employer strategies or values, is the causal variable at work. 
And finally, there is a debate in the United States concerning what 
unions should do about their current plight. One view has it that unions 
need to rebuild lost militance to fight more effectively against managerial 
opposition (Goldfield 1987; Moody 1988; Parker and Slaughter 1988); 
another view argues that unions need to be more open to engagement in 
managerial decision making (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986; 
Heckscher 1988). My argument is situated between these two positions: 
labor needs both integration into managerial decision making and a more 
cohesive movement of its own, both engagement with management on 
new work organization and more assertive unions.20 The polarization of 
the debate into cooperation versus militance inhibits the development of 
appropriate strategies to rebuild the U.S. labor movement. 
Unions are not in decline everywhere. There are demonstrable precon-
ditions for contemporary union success, and these preconditions are lo-
cated primarily in the structures of interest representation. We now turn 
to the evidence, beginning in the next two chapters with an examination 
of the politics of work reorganization in the U.S. and West German auto 
industries. 
20
 See also Banks and Metzgar 1989; Herzenberg 1989. Unions, for example, could 
actively promote proactive strategies for new work organization (as many are attempting 
to do) and at the same time could unite in campaigns for new national legislation to regulate 
workers' and unions' participation in management. 
